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PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*
Oscar Schachterf
The activities of international organization generally are remote from
the problems of the private lawyer; but in one area-that of private
foreign investment-the "bread and butter" interests of the practitioner
intersect with the objectives of world organization. This has been
evident, for some time, to some of the more specialized members of
the Bar, but relatively few lawyers appear to be aware of the extent to
which the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, and their related organizations, have concerned them-
selves with legal and economic problems of interest to the private
investor. The present paper will attempt to survey this area of interna-
tional activity with the aim of indicating the extent to which international
mechanisms and laws are being used and developed in regard to the
promotion and protection of private foreign investment. This subject
will be viewed primarily from the standpoint of the issues and problems
which have arisen in the United Nations and its related organizations.
It should perhaps be made clear at the outset that private foreign
investment, while considered desirable by most members of the United
Nations, is not the principal focus of their efforts in the field of economic
development. Their primary objective has been the provision of public
funds for development purposes, either by way of liberal loans or grants-
in-aid. This is not a matter of theory or dogma; the experience of the
last decade has shown that private funds cannot be expected to flow to
under-developed countries on any substantial scale (except in the field
of petroleum and other mineral resources) until basic economic, social
and administrative conditions are stabilized, or at least considerably
improved.' It has been repeatedly pointed out that under-development
* Mr. Schachter is Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations. The
views expressed, except where otherwise indicated, are made in his personal capacity.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 558, for biographical data.
1 United Nations reports have indicated that there are a number of countries which
remain unable to attract any form of private foreign investment in significant amounts.
These reports have distinguished four categories of capital-importing countries:
(a) Advanced industrial countries which offer to each other large markets and
investment opportunities. Capital movements among these countries account for a
large part of the international flow of entrepreneurial capital and for the bulk of
portfolio investments;
(b) Rapidly expanding countries with a substantial industrial sector. This category,
which includes Australia, Canada and the Union of South Africa and such developing
countries as Brazil and Mexico, is small but quantitatively very important. Most
foreign investment in these countries takes place through the establishment of branches
and subsidiaries which reinvest a large part of their profits. Portfolio investment in
Australia and Canada is also substantial;
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is itself the major obstacle to private investment, and that to overcome
under-development, it is essential that there be a large number of
projects which are non-self-liquidating, "low-yielding and slow-yielding,"
to pave the way for other investments.2 This fact is recognized by not
only the under-developed countries seeking financial assistance, but by
the capital exporting countries interested in private investment abroad.
The United States International Development Advisory Board has con-
cluded that private capital is not likely to play a major role in the
development of either Asia or Africa. The real need in these areas,
the Board felt, is for capital in "social overhead"-power, communica-
tions, transportation, and educational facilities.' These are not fields
into which private capital can be expected to flow. For this reason,
large scale public investment is a prerequisite to a substantial increase
in the flow of private capital. Consequently, the various international
arrangements for providing governmental funds to the under-developed
countries must be regarded as high on the list of international mecha-
nisms which both promote and (in a sense) protect private foreign
investment. This point has been stressed in proposals to increase the
resources of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the International Monetary Fund, and even more emphatically in
connection with the forthcoming establishment of the International
Development Association. 4 Similarly, new regional investment agencies,
such as the Inter-American Bank, the European Investment Bank, and
the Development Fund for the Overseas Countries, should be viewed
as part of international efforts being made to provide the infra-structure
which is a condition precedent for private investment.
The Mobilization of Private Development Capital Through International
Institutions
Although international financial institutions are generally thought of
as principally providing public funds, it should not be overlooked that
they, too, are mechanisms for funnelling private capital to the under-
(c) Low-income countries which possess natural resources, mostly in the form of
oil and non-ferrous metals. Nearly all foreign investments in these countries are made
by large international companies and are concentrated in developing these resources;
(d) Low-income countries which have neither important natural resources nor
domestic markets for absorbing the production of large enterprises. These countries,
which include the poorest countries in Asia, continue to receive little private capital.
(1959) "The International Flow of Private Capital, 1956-1958," U.N. Doc. No. E/3249, p. 11
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 59 1ID 2).
2 Report of the United Nations Subcommission on Economic Development-Fourth
Session-U.N. Doc. E/CN.1/80, p. 21 (1950).
3 Report of the International Development Advisory Board to the President 13 (1957).
4 President Eisenhower's address to the Colombo Plan Meeting on November 10, 1958,
reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1958, p. 14. See U.N. Doc. No. E/3528 (1959).
5 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Sess., 2d Comm., 559th Meeting (1958); Report of U.N.
Secretary-General in U.N. Doc. No. E/3258 (1959).
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developed areas. The International Bank, by borrowing private money
in the capital markets of North America and Western Europe is, in a
sense, a large investment fund through which private capital is utilized
in the under-developed countries. New borrowings by the Bank in 1958
reached a gross total of 650 million dollars; there has, moreover, been
a significant broadening of the market for World Bank bonds, and at
the end of the 1958-1959 fiscal year, it was estimated that almost half
of the Bank's total obligations were held by investors outside of the
United States.'
In addition, the International Bank offers opportunities for private
participation in bank lending operations; in the last year such participa-
tion took place in the majority of the Bank's loans. 7 The private in-
vestors, in these cases, take the short-term and medium-term maturities
and receive the protection which results from the Bank's retention of
the long-term obligations. The Bank also joins with the market in
investment operations by making loans simultaneously with the floating
of bonds by the borrowing government.8 These techniques are interesting
examples of the way a public international organization has contributed
to the mobilization of private capital for foreign investment.
The International Finance Corporation, like the International Bank,
has authority to borrow funds by selling its own obligations on the world
market. However, at the present stage, it does not use this authority,
but has available for investment purposes public funds plus its own
earnings. Its function is to provide venture capital to private investors
without government guarantees of repayment. Ordinarily, the private
investor will be required to supply more than half the capital needed for
a project; management is left largely to the private enterpreneur. This
international mechanism thus provides capital which enables private
investors to undertake promising projects otherwise held back for lack
of sufficient funds. It also directs private investors to profitable op-
portunities abroad, and furnishes an incentive to them to enter the
field by an offer of financial partnership. The organization has laid
stress on the multiplying effect of the I.F.C.'s attracting larger amounts
of private capital, suggesting a ratio of $3.50 of private funds for every
dollar invested by the I.F.C. ° It may be noted that the I.F.C. is barred
6 Fourteenth Annual Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment 13-14 (1958-59).
7 Id. at 14.
8 Id. at 15. The Bank has broad authority to guarantee loan investments against non-
payment, but in actual fact little use has been made of this authority. See I.B.R.D., The
World Bank: Policies and Operations 92 (1957).
o See First Annual Report of the International Finance Corp. 5 (1956-57). Also
Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1102, 1109'(1958).
10 Address of the President at the 2nd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of
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from holding common or preferred stock, apparently on the ground
that such capital stock would involve it in management responsibilities
inconsistent with the private character of the businesses it would assist. 1
These institutional schemes for funnelling private funds to the under-
developed countries have only met a small part of the need, and ideas
for further programs of this kind have been suggested. Recently, for
example, the World Federation of United Nations Associations
(WFUNA) has proposed to the Economic and Social Council the estab-
lishment of a new international fund for which capital would be raised
by issuing bonds or certificates of small denominations which would be
sold to individual investors or to institutions.' The funds would then
be invested through loans or equity investment in underdeveloped coun-
tries. It is far from evident that marketing of small-denomination bonds
would augment significantly the flow of private capital, and it may be
that this proposal should be viewed more as a means of demonstrating
public support for economic development of the less-developed countries
than as a means of financial assistance.
International "Intelligence" and Advice
Development capital, the President of the International Bank has
noted, is not just money--"It is money applied effectively to the stimula-
tion of economic growth. That means that it is money welded into an
amalgam with a very special set of attitudes, institutions and technol-
ogy."'3 In line with this, the United Nations and its related organizations
have performed what might be characterized as an international "intel-
ligence" function, by providing in a lengthy series of reports and studies
the facts which are essential for an understanding of the ways to increase
the flow of private capital.' 4 These reports and studies have shown how
complex and subtle is the process required to create a favorable invest-
ment climate. They have dealt with the varied, almost unlimited, range
the International Finance Corp., October 8, 1958, reported in U.N. Press Release IB/803.
See, also, Third Annual Report of the International Finance Corp. 10-11 (1958-59).
11 See Tenth Annual Report of the International Bank 27 (1954-55) (relating to the
establishment of the International Finance Corp.).
12 U.N. EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. 26th Sess., 1037th meeting, 17 July 1958, ff 42 (State-
ment of Mr. Adrian Pelt).
13 International Financial News Survey 131 (October 17, 1958).
14 See, for example, U.N. Secretariat, "The International Flow of Private Capital (1946-
52)," U.N. Doc. No. E/2531 (1954); "Survey of Policies Affecting Private Foreign Invest-
ment," U.N. Doc. No. E/1614/Rev. 1 (1950); "International Flow of Private Capital for the
Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries," U.N. Doc. No. E/2546 (1954);
"Recent Governmental Measures Affecting the International Flow of Private Capital,"
U.N. Doc. No. E/2766 (1955); "The International Flow of Private Capital, 1957," U.N.
Doc. No. E/3128 (1958); "The International Flow of Private Capital 1956-1958," U.N. Doc.
No. E/3249 (1959).
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of factors which bear upon the flow of private capital-and if they have
done nothing else, they have shown how futile it is to single out one
element as the key to private investment.
In some measure, the conclusions of these reports and studies have
been enacted in resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic
and Social Council, setting forth in general terms the action that should
be taken by national governments to further the flow of private capital.-,
These resolutions, like their underlying studies, have no legislative
effect; rather, they are proposals for governmental action to be taken
in the discretion of governments.
What good, it may be asked, have they done for the private investor?
To what extent has national action been influenced? Although we have
no handy measuring rods, there are indications that the process has not
all been in vain. For one thing, plain talking and sharp analysis have
undoubtedly lead to greater understanding and sophistication. It has
probably become clearer to the recipient countries that they are in a
competitive market as buyers of capital, and that comparative risks, as
well as prospective returns, are factors in determining the flow of funds
to their countries. In this connection, one may compare the resolutions
favoring private investment adopted by the United Nations in 195416
to the 1952 resolutions on "sovereignty over natural resources" which
caused concern in investing circles.
In 1958 the General Assembly decided" that the United Nations
should undertake a more intensive and detailed inquiry into the condi-
tions and opportunities for private investment. The Secretariat was
requested to consult qualified persons regarding the fields of activity in
which foreign private investment was needed and sought by under-
developed countries, and the volume and forms in which such investment
would be acceptable. The Secretariat was also asked to obtain the views
of qualified persons concerning the types (and, where possible, specific
examples) of projects which private foreign investors might, under
suitable circumstances, be interested in financing or undertaking in
under-developed countries. These inquiries were to be made by inter-
viewing businessmen, government officials, and experts in both the
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. The Secretary-General
was then to report concerning measures for the channelling of an
15 For example, U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 824 (IX) (December 11, 1954); U.N. EcoSoc
Council Res. 512 B (XVII) (April 30, 1954).
16 Ibid.
17 U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 626 (VII) (December 21, 1952). See Hyde, 'Termanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Wealth and Resources," 50 Am. J. Intl L. 854 (1956).
18 U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1318 (XIII) (1958).
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increase in flow of private capital investment under mutually satisfactory
arrangements. 19
Another, and undoubtedly more significant, role of "intelligence" is
carried out by the newly-established Special Fund of the United Nations.
This organization, instituted by the General Assembly of the U.N. in
1958, has as one of its main objectives the acceleration of a country's
capacity for absorbing investment capital.20 One of its principal tasks is
to obtain greater knowledge of the physical resources of less-developed
countries: their mineral resources, river flow, soil content, and industrial
potential. The Managing Director of the Special Fund, Mr. Paul
Hoffman, has indicated that major emphasis will be placed upon projects
that will demonstrate the wealth-producing potential of unsurveyed
resources, and upon surveys leading to early investment.2 '
International organizations have also undertaken a great variety of
"advisory services" which, in many cases, have a close relationship to
the practical requirements of private investors. Governments have been
given technical help on taxation, monetary, and banking matters, which
have led to needed changes in their legal and administrative structure.22
A number of techniques and devices, e.g., national development banks
and joint venture arrangements, have been suggested for encouraging
private investment. These techniques and devices have conformed to
a trend toward arrangements whereby direct private investment is
combined with public investment from national or international sources.
Two related areas are of particular interest to the private lawyer:
the first concerns the various problems of tax incentives and the wider
application of double taxation agreements. United Nations activity in
this field has consisted not only of studies and reports 3 but also of direct
assistance to Governments desiring to adopt suitable tax provisions. 4
The second area of special interest to the private lawyer may be described
as the standardization of the provisions of legal instruments used in
international investment transactions. It has been suggested that such
provisions might be developed for use in mortgage and security instru-
ments; there has also been an interest in having internationally approved
19 A progress report entitled "The Promotion of the International Flow of Private Capital"
was issued by the Secretary-General on February 25, 1960. U.N. Doc. No. E/3325 (1960).
20 U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 1240 (XIII) (1958).
21 Hoffman, "Operation Breakthrough," 38 For. Aff. 31, 41 (1959).
22 Such services are provided by the International Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and the United Nations. See Bloch, "The Fiscal Advisory Functions of United
Nations Technical Assistance," 11 Int'l Org. 248 (1957).
23 U.N. Secretariat, "The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade and Investment," (1950)
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1950 XVI.1); "United States Income Taxation of Private United
States Investment in Latin America," (1953) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1953 XVI.1). See also
"International Tax Problems," U.N. Docs. No. E/3074 and addenda (1958).
24 See Bloch, op. cit. supra note 22.
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standard clauses for construction and engineering contracts.25 Until
now, little has been done along these lines, although the Economic
Commission for Europe has devised standard clauses for use in sales
contracts drawn up in international trade between the European member
countries. 26 There would appear to be advantages in seeking to develop
standard contract clauses through international bodies or agreements;
this could be achieved by bringing together experts representing both
capital-exporting and capital-importing interests. Such meetings would
involve a form of negotiation, through which compromise clauses might
subsequently emerge. Although clauses would not be a substitute for
specific contract negotiations, it seems almost certain that they would
facilitate the task of reaching agreement in particular cases by providing
models which have already received a measure of acceptance by a group
of qualified persons representing the various interests concerned.
Investment Treaties and Codes
It has been suggested that the international mechanisms of the kind
discussed above, while helpful to private investment, do not go far
enough in providing the investor with the required security. What is
needed, it is urged, is an internationally-accepted code in which govern-
ments would undertake, in reasonably specific terms, legal obligations
to permit foreign capital to invest, and to assure equitable and non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals and property. A code of
this kind would be expected to include guarantees to the investor that
contracts and other commitments would be observed, that just compensa-
tion would be granted, and that adequate procedural remedies would be
afforded. A code of this kind was suggested several years ago by the
International Chamber of Commerce, and in recent years similar pro-
posals have been made by unofficial groups2 7
Within the United Nations-and throughout its history-hopes have
also been expressed that a legally binding international code-or
"charter"-on foreign investment would be attained. At least in one
case, the Havana Charter, an investment "code" was negotiated and
25 See, Proceedings of First Int'l Investment Law Conf., (4th Sess.), p. 11 (1956) (remarks
of N. A. Bogdan).
26 Report of the Comm'n on the Development of Trade to the Economic Comm'n for
Europe, 7th Session U.N. Doc. No. E/ECE/Trade/33 (1958).
27 International Chamber of Commerce, Brochure No. 129 (1953), contains the proposed
"International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments." A draft code entitled
"International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights on
Foreign Countries" has been proposed by the Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign
Investments, the headquarters of which are in Cologne, Germany. For discussions of these
draft conventions, see Miller, "Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral
Convention," 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 371 (1959). See also Brandon, "An International Invest-
ment Code: Current Plans," J. Bus. L. 7 (Jan. 1959).
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drafted at a multilateral conference.28 In the early years of the United
Nations there was a good deal of interest in the proposed investment
code, but after the demise of the Havana Charter, it was widely con-
sidered that the time was not ripe for a multilateral treaty. 9 In the
last year or two, there has been a revival of interest of governments in
such an accord, stimulated largely, perhaps, by activity on the part of
private groups. At the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya
called for an international charter to safeguard the legitimate rights of
foreign investors in the countries of Asia,30 a proposal which stirred
some hopes especially because it was made by a representative of an
under-developed country.
Virtually no one disputes the value of an international investment
code, if it could be attained in satisfactory terms. The significant ques-
tions concern the reasonable probability that this could be achieved and
the means by which this end could be effected.
It cannot be said that past experience in the United Nations or else-
where offers much encouragement. In both the case of the Havana
Charter and the Bogota Economic Agreement of 1948, the proposals for
the protection of investment were so whittled down in the negotiations
and subjected to reservations that the provisions which emerged were
vague and ambiguous, offering little security to either the private in-
vestor or the capital-exporting government. From this experience, many
have concluded that it is futile-and perhaps even dangerous-to attempt
a, multilateral investment code.31 In large measure, this is attributable
to the tendency of many capital-importing countries to counter assur-
ances to private investment with broad declarations of sovereign rights
over property in their territory. Even countries favorable to private
investment have indicated their unwillingness to accept international
commitments toward foreign investment without far-reaching reserva-
tions which would assure the supremacy of national interests and
procedures.32 It has, moreover, come to be realized ,that the major
capital-exporting countries might not be able to accept the same restric-
tions upon their authority in respect of foreign property that have been
28 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Ch. 3, Arts. 11 and 12.(1948).
29 Asher, et al., The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare 333, 334
(1958). U.N. EcoSoc Council, .Report of the 4th Sess. of Subcomm'n on Economic Develop-
ment 10-11 (1950).
30 Annual Report of the Economic Comm'n for Asia and the Far East (1957-58),
U.N. EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. Supp. No. 2 at 24.
31 Rubin, Private Foreign Investment: Legal and Economic Realities 80 (1956); U.N.
EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. 24th Sess. 200 (1957) (Statement of the Representative of the
United States).
32 Rubin, supra note 31 at 20 and 81, citing particularly the difficulties Canada ex-
perienced.
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proposed for less-developed countries. It may, for example, be questioned
whether the United States would not encounter constitutional and
political difficulties in the way of agreeing to such treaty restrictions on
"eminent domain" and the police power as have been proposed in almost
all of the suggested investment codes. 3
Although these-and other-obstacles are formidable, an entirely
negative impression may not be warranted. One suggested line of ap-
proach would be to seek investment agreements among groups of
States which are likely to respond favorably. The members of the OEEC,
for example, may find a common basis of agreements on the lines of the
bilateral agreements which several of them have already concluded
with the United States. 4 Perhaps the Asian members of the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East, or some of them, may be able to
undertake preliminary discussions on the basis of the proposal of the
Malayan Prime Minister in an effort to attain some agreement. It has
also been suggested that the proposed International Development As-
sociation draft a group of general principles for private foreign invest-
ment which would not be legally binding, but which could serve as a
standard of conduct.35
The bilateral approach also offers certain advantages as demonstrated
in several of the post-war treaties which the United States has concluded
with capital-importing States and which contain reasonably specific com-
mitments favorable to the foreign investor. 6 It may be hoped that the
extension of such agreements would eventually contribute to the general
acceptance of their principles and, thus, facilitate agreement upon a
universal convention in the future. However, it is only realistic to note
that the satisfactory bilateral treaties have been concluded with countries
that have an already favorable attitude toward private investment, and
that the treaty may be considered as registering that favorable climate
rather than creating it. In countries where political tendencies have
given rise to difficulties for private capital, effective bilateral agree-
ments have not been concluded. For some of these countries, the
multilateral approach may prove more acceptable, and carry fewer
connotations of "capitulations," than bilateral treaties, especially if
the machinery of the United Nations is used.
33 See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Georgia v. City of Chattanooga,
264 U.S. 472 (1924) ; Atlantic Coast Line v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
34 Professor Richard N. Gardner has observed that a treaty negotiated among the former
colonial Powers "would hardly commend itself to the leaders of the underdeveloped
countries" "International Measures for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Invest-
ments," 53 Proc. Am. Soc'y Intl L. 255, 262 (1959).
35 Id. at 265.
36 Walker, "Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice," 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229 (1956); Wilson, "'Treaty-Investor'
Clauses in Commercial Treaties of the United States," 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 366 (1955).
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Some observers have considered that there has been a growth in mutual
understanding during the last decade; there is, therefore, more reason
to hope that multilateral negotiation might focus upon the issues likely
to produce agreement rather than upon political catch-phrases.37 It may
be that specific questions, such as the repatriation of capital and earn-
ings, "joint ventures," and voluntary arbitral procedures, would be the
subjects upon which fairly precise agreement could be attained.
The Law of State Responsibility
On some broad issues, it may be the better part of wisdom not to
press for treaty commitments, but to seek clarification and greater preci-
sion through practice and "re-statements." This would be based on the
body of customary international law which is pertinent to the rights of
investors abroad-the law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens.
Probably more than any other area of international law, this subject
is the product of case-law-of numerous decisions of claims tribunals
and arbitral bodies which have applied international norms to the acts
of governments affecting foreign nationals and their property. It is,
for that reason, a rich source of precedents and principles which private
investors and their governments can utilize in asserting claims for
protection and compensation. On the other hand-and this is the heart
of the problem-there is considerable uncertainty whether past prec-
edents and ideas are effective in the light of altered conceptions of State
control over national resources, particularly as manifested in the less-
developed capital-importing countries."8 To ignore these contemporary
Aittitudes and merely to reiterate the maxims of the past would probably
be a species of self-deception.
Is it possible to bridge the gap between what appear to be the pro-
foundly different conceptions in this field? One attempt is being made
by the United Nations, through its International Law Commission, in
its projected codification of the law of International Responsibility, which
has been under way for the last four years. The reports prepared by
Dr. F. V. Garcia-Amador of Cuba, the Special Rapporteur for the sub-
ject, have constituted an interesting effort to take stock both of past
precedents and the contemporary attitudes of governments, and to
suggest in some cases new formulations intended to embrace conflicting
principles.39 He has, for example, sought to overcome the traditional
37 See Asher, et al., op. cit. supra note 29. A more skeptical attitude is expressed by
Miller, op. cit. supra note 27 at 375.
38 1 Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 154 (1957) (discussion relating to Mr. Garcia-Amador's
Second Report on State Responsibility). See also, Hyde, op. cit. supra note 17.
39 Reports of Mr. Garcia-Amador to the Int'l Law Comm'n: (1) "International Responsi-
bility," U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/96 (20 January 1956). (2) "Responsibility of the State for
[Vol. 45
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
conflict between the "international standard of justice" and the principle
of "national treatment" by integrating both concepts under the more
general principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 40  Ac-
cordingly, protection of the alien against arbitrary action by the state
would rest upon recognized human rights with respect to which "custom-
ary international law makes no distinction between nationals and aliens,
and necessarily implies a regime of equality in the use and enjoyment of
such rights and freedoms."41 In line with this general approach, the
Special Rapporteur has proposed reliance on certain general principles
of municipal law as a basis for determining the elements of international
responsibility, particularly in cases concerning expropriation of property.
The three main principles suggested in this connection are the obligation
to respect acquired rights, the doctrine of unjust enrichment, and the
concept of abuse of rights (or "arbitrariness").'
With regard to contractual obligations, he has gone beyond the tradi-
tional view by suggesting that some contracts between states and indi-
viduals may be genuinely "international" in character, in the sense that
non-fulfillment of their clauses would directly give rise to the interna-
tional responsibility of the state. 3 In his view, such "internationalized"
contracts would comprise first, contracts which contain a stipulation
that the instrument be governed by public international law or by
"general principles of law," and second, those contracts which contain
arbitration clauses which contemplate the settlement of disputes by
means of international arbitration. This suggestion rests on the premise
that a state which has contracted in this manner has, in effect, conferred
upon the individual a measure of "international personality and capac-
ity.144 It must be emphasized that, while these ideas are not entirely
novel,45 they are far from being generally accepted; within the Inter-
national Law Commission they have thus far received only preliminary
consideration.
It may be asked why a proposed code of international responsibility
Injuries caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aiens--Pt. 1: Acts and Omis-
sions," U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/106 (15 February 1957). (3) "Responsibility of the State
for Injuries caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens-Pt. 2: The Interna-
tional Claim," U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/111 (2 January 1958). (4) "Responsibility of the
State for Injuries caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens-Measures affect-
ing Acquired Rights," U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/119 (26 February 1959).
40 Garda-Amador, 2d Report, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/106, pp. 24-33 (1957).
41 Garcia-Amador, 4th Report, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/119, p. 20 (1959).
42 Id. at 6-21. For a similar approach see, Fatouros, "Legal Security for Int'l Invest-
ment," Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment 699-733 (Friedmann ed. 1959).
43 Garcia-Amador, 4th Report, op. cit. supra note 41 at 76, 83.
44 Id. at 87.
45 Schwebel, "International Protection of Contractual Arrangements," 53 Proc. Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. 266 (1959); Carlston, "Concession Agreements and Nationalization," 52
Am. J. Intl L. 260 (1958), 69 Harv. L. Rev. 802-03 (1956).
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would be more realistic than an investment treaty-would not the same
basic conflicts lead to a stalemate or to ineffectual generalities? This
may well be so if an attempt is made, within the next few years, to
convert an International Law Commission draft into a treaty. The
alternative would be for the Commission to treat the draft-and the
underlying studies-as the framework for a long-range effort to find
common elements of agreement, without calling on governments to adopt
binding commitments at the present time. It is not unrealistic to expect
that the process of study and discussion will itself result in some
clarification of basic issues, and that the elaboration of international
standards by a widely-representative group will tend to influence the
application of those standards in concrete cases. True, such international
standards will not be the same as those which a purely capital-exporting
group would adopt. But they are likely to be more acceptable in those
under-developed areas which were represented in the preparatory process
and which, therefore, will not consider them as the product of the
creditor States alone.
Nor should it be disappointing if the drafts produced by an interna-
tional process appear to be an amalgam of opposing principles from
which either side in a particular controversy could draw support for its
claims. This would be not only a consequence of compromise; it would
express the important truth that in a complex matter, each of two
opposing general principles will have elements of validity, and that joined
together they will provide a more rational guide than either principle
standing by itself. Paul Freund, in discussing a similar approach in
American constitutional law, has eloquently expressed this notion of
polarity:
These abstractions, arrayed in intransigent hostility like robot sentinels
facing each other across a border, can become useful guardians on either
hand in the climb to truth if they can be made to march together. Some-
how the lifeblood of the concrete problem tempers the mechanical arro-
gance of abstractions.46
This, of course, raises the question of who is to make the opposing
abstractions march together in the concrete case-who will perform the
judicial or arbitral function of balancing the conflicting claims and
principles? In the absence of a widely-accepted system of international
jurisdiction, agreement on substantive rules of international responsibility
will fall short of providing the remedies that practical lawyers consider
necessary. Diplomatic protection may provide some means of recourse,
415 69 Harv. L. Rev. 803. Myres McDougal has also expressed this conception in his writ-
ings on international law. See, e.g., his Hague Academy Lectures on International Law,
Power, and Policy (1953).
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but its highly political character and heightened sensibilities about its
use have made it, in most circumstances, an uncertain and dubious
instrument for the protection of foreign investments.,' Proposals for
international claims tribunals-on a general or regional basis-have
often been advanced, but have found little response among govern-
ments.48 - A suggestion was made in the United Nations for machinery
through which particular controversies of an economic character would
be dealt with in a manner analogous to political controversies, as by
using mediators and observers-and perhaps "collective measures". 49
It is too soon to say whether this proposal is likely to bear fruit in the
future.
Arbitration Between Governments and Investors
Whatever may be the obstacles to reaching agreement in general terms
on procedural remedies, experience has shown that satisfactory provi-
sions for settling disputes have been agreed upon in bilateral negotiations
between foreign investing companies and governments. Such provisions
take the form of arbitration clauses providing either for institutional
arbitration or for ad hoc arbitration, generally with third party designa-
tion of a neutral arbitrator. Arbitration clauses of this kind, which are
found in many oil and mining agreements, usually reflect situations in
which the governments are sufficiently desirous of foreign capital in the
particular case that they are prepared to waive the usual requirement of
submission to local courts. It has often been urged that similar arbitra-
tion agreements be introduced in other types of contracts made for
foreign investment. Experienced lawyers, such as Lord Shawcross,
Martin Domke, and G. W. Haight, have persuasively argued that arbitra-
tion clauses in investment agfeements would be of considerable mutual
advantage to both the capital-importing country and the investor.50
While it cannot be demonstrated that the absence of! arbitration proce-
dures constitutes a decisive obstacle to the flow of investment generally,
there is reason to believe that many enterprises, especially those operat-
ing on a large scale, will be concerned about the risk of a government
relying on its "sovereign" power to over-ride or cancel contractual
47 De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, p. 269 (Corbett
transl. 1957).
48 See, e.g., Cowles, "Review of the United Nations Charter and the Adjudication of In-
ternational Claims," 48 Am. J. Int'l L. 460 (1954).
49 Mr. Luns (Netherlands), U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Sess. at 26 (1958). See also,
Metzger, "Settlement of International Disputes by Non-Judicial Methods," 48 Am., J. Int'l
L. 408 (1954).
50 Domke, "The Settlement of International Investment -Disputes," 12 Bus. Law. 264
(1957) and "Arbitration in Inter-Governmental Economic Relations," 7 Arb. J. (n.s.) 73
(1952); Haight, "American Foreign Trade and Investment Disputes," 14 Arb. J. (n.s.) 73
(1959).
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arrangements. For such firms, the willingness of a government to con-
tract for neutral arbitration in case of dispute is itself a significant
symptom that the investment climate is favorable, and may be an
important element in deciding to proceed with the investment.
From this point of view, the measures which various United Nations
bodies have taken to further arbitration in disputes of a private law
character should, at least in the long run, have a beneficial effect on the
flow of investment capital to under-developed countries.
The Economic and Social Council, and the Regional Economic Com-
mission for Europe and for Asia and the Far East, have adopted resolu-
tions intended to have a practical effect in furthering arbitration in
international transactions. In 1959 the Council adopted a resolution
which proposed ways in which interested governments and organizations
might make practical contributions toward the more effective use of
arbitration. 1 These measures had originally been proposed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and approved by the Conference
on International Commercial Arbitration held in 1958. Emphasis was
placed upon the importance of educational activities, particularly in
promoting among members of the business community knowledge about
arbitration facilities, and encouraging the inclusion of arbitration clauses
in contracts. Governments were asked to consider improving their
arbitral legislation and institutions and, where appropriate, to develop
new arbitration facilities. The Secretariat of the United Nations was
requested to assist governments and private organizations in their
efforts to improve arbitral legislation, practice and institutions, principally
by helping them to obtain technical advice and by providing guidance
in coordinating their progress and promoting arbitration in international
trade and investment.5
2
In the Economic Commission for Europe an ad hoc working group on
arbitration composed of government experts has, for some years, studied
possible solutions of problems created by differences in national legis-
lation concerning arbitration, and has attempted to devise machinery
for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator or the designation of a neutral
place of arbitration in cases where the parties themselves cannot reach
agreement.53 In Asia and the Far East, the Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East has requested the U. N. Secretariat to study
51 EcoSoc Council Res. 708 (XXVII) (April 17, 1959).
52 See U.N. Secretary-General, Annual Report on the Work of the Organization for
1958-59, p. 97.
53 See Kopelmanas, "Quelques Probl~mes R~cents De L'arbitrage Commercial Interna-
tional," Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Commercial 879-911 (1957, No. 4). See also, U.N.
Doc. No. ECE/TRADE/WP.1/33, 34 (1959).
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existing law and practice and to formulate recommendations to further
the use of arbitration in that region. 4
One aspect of international arbitration-the problem of assuring
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards-has been dealt with
by multilateral treaty. As a result of the initiative taken by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce,55 a United Nations Conference of
States, held in 1958, adopted a United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.56 This Con-
vention was designed to facilitate the carrying out of arbitral awards
made in the territory or under the law of a state other than the state
in which recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought. The
Convention provides for the recognition of the validity of arbitral agree-
ments and for simplification of the conditions for obtaining recognition
and enforcement in a foreign country. It is of interest, in the present
context, because it may be applied to the enforcement of arbitral awards
arising out of contracts between an individual and a foreign government.
The Convention contains no express provision on this point, but its
scope extends to awards arising out of differences "between persons,
whether physical or legal". The records of the drafting Conference of
1958 indicate an intention to cover cases in which a state or public
body has entered into arbitral agreement in its capacity as an entity
having rights and duties under private law.5" In this connection it may
be noted that the Convention has been signed by a number of govern-
ments which normally conduct their foreign trade through state agencies.
A reasonable interpretation, therefore, is that while no state is compelled
to arbitrate, the Convention would apply to awards rendered against
a state party to the Convention in arbitration proceedings relating to
transactions having a private law character.
Although the Convention deals with the secondary problem of enforc-
ing awards where arbitration has been used, it also has served to focus
attention on the primary problem of obtaining agreement on using
arbitration in the first instance. It has been urged by some that a multi-
54 Report of the Committee on Trade to the Economic Comm'n for Asia and the Far
East, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.11/497.f[ 47-49 (Feb. 19, 1959).
55 International Chamber of Commerce, Brochure 174 (1953). The I.C.C. representa-
tives, Mr. Morris Rosenthal and Mrs. Roberta Lussardi, bad a significant role in stimulating
action by the United Nations.
50 U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58 V 6. See also Sanders, "New York Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards," 6 Neth. Int'l Law Review 43 (1959);
Contini, "International Commercial Arbitration," 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 283 (1959).
5T See Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Summary Analysis of Record of U.N. Conference 5-7 (1958). See also Comments of
Mr. Leo M. Drachsler, 53 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 284-5 (1959); Contini, op. cit. supra note
56 at 294. For a general discussion of measures that may be taken to enforce awards against
States, see Schachter, "The Enforcement of International judicial and Arbitral Decisions,"
54 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1960).
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lateral treaty might also be adopted to achieve obligatory arbitration
by states in disputes arising out of investment contracts.ss Although some
Asian countries (notably, the Federation of Malaya) have been favorably
disposed to such a suggestion, it seems improbable that many capital-
importing countries will accept compulsory provisions of a general
character for third-party arbitration, even though they may be agreeable
to such arbitration provisions in specific contracts. A somewhat different
approach, which may be more acceptable to some governments, would
be the establishment of regional arbitration centers, under the aegis
of the regional economic commission of the United Nations. The centers
would extend services and facilities to the governments and business
communities; they would advise on arbitration clauses and procedures;
they would stimulate knowledge of arbitration and where appropriate,
advise on legislative and institutional changes. They might also, if
called upon by the parties, designate institutions to appoint neutral
arbitrators or, perhaps, make such appointments themselves. Such
centers would be entirely voluntary, but as they would be established
by the governments of the underdeveloped countries in cooperation with
the business community, they are likely to have the confidence of those
governments and consequently more influence than a purely private
organization or one outside of the particular region.
An institutional development on these lines, a kind of "joint venture"
of governments and business, would, in the present circumstances, appear
to be a more practical objective for the United Nations than more
ambitious plans for multilateral compulsory arbitration agreements.
Conclusion
The foregoing survey, while not exhaustive, has been sufficient to
indicate the variety of activities undertaken by the United Nations and
its related organs in promoting and protecting private foreign invest-
ment. What merits emphasis is the wide and flexible range of techniques
that can be carried out through international organizations, and the
machinery that such organizations provide for continuity of effort.59 For
it is evident that the creation of a hospitable investment atmosphere
cannot be a one-shot affair or the result of any single approach. It is
also suggested that, at the present time, more probably can be accomp-
lished by the providing of facilities and services by international organi-
zation than by the elaboration of precise rules of law in treaty form. But
58 See U.N. Secretary-General, "The Promotion of the International Flow of Private
Capital," U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, pp. 78, 79 (1960).
59 See address by U.N. Secretary-General to the American Banker's Association, March
23, 1960. U.N. Press Release SG/904.
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this does not mean that efforts to attain legal security should be
abandoned; rather, expectations and objectives should not be set too
high. In this respect, international organizations have done much to
demonstrate the complexity of the problems and their difficulties; at the
same time they have clarified to a considerable degree the common
interest shared both by the investor and the country of investment. In
the final analysis, it is only on the basis of recognition of such common
interest that an adequate legal order can be firmly established.
